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This case study of recent efforts to deconcentrate poverty within the Skid Row area of Los
Angeles examines processes of ‘weak-center’ gentrification as it applies to a ‘service
dependent ghetto,’ thus filling two key gaps in prior scholarship. We document the
collaboration between the government, business and development interests, and certain
non-profit agencies in this process and identify two key mechanisms of poverty
deconcentration: housing/service displacement and the criminalization of low income
residents. Following Harvey, we argue that these efforts are driven by pressures to find
a ‘spatial fix’ for capital accumulation through Downtown redevelopment. This process
has been hotly contested, however, illustrating the strength of counter-pressures to
gentrification/poverty deconcentration within ‘weak-center’ urban areas.
Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, the incidence of poverty in America hardly increased, but
it became far more spatially concentrated, resulting in the greater likelihood that poor
people would contend with even more limited opportunities (Wilson, 1987). By the early
1990s, fears of such purported ill effects contributed to the rise of the deconcentration of
poverty as the dominant policy response to urban inequality in most American cities.
This shift involves public policies that explicitly disperse zones of extreme poverty —
particularly in inner-city areas — by encouraging the inclusion of higher-income groups
and housing subsidies (Wyly and Hammel, 1999; Crump, 2002). The most prominent
strategy includes the wholesale demolition of high-rise public housing, followed by
mixed-income developments (Hackworth, 2003; Hammel, 2006; Wilson, 2006). These
authors (and others) point to a strong connection between poverty deconcentration and
gentrification, in which the former clearly precedes, and is part of, a broader state-
subsidized and globalized strategy to remake cities along higher-class lines (Smith,
2002).
We wish to contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between poverty
deconcentration and gentrification by addressing two key gaps. First, we focus on the
political struggles over efforts to deconcentrate poverty in a much less prominent zone of
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concentrated poverty — not public housing, but rather the ‘service-dependent ghetto,’
where the homeless, discharged psychiatric patients, parolees and other marginalized
populations are concentrated in close proximity to services and cheap housing (Dear and
Wolch, 1987). Second, we wish to explore deconcentration efforts within a context of
what we term ‘weak-center’ gentrification, that is, within cities that lack strong or
high-amenity downtowns to act as centers of gravity for anchoring gentrification.
Particularly in the American Sunbelt, urbanization tends to be low-density, car-oriented
and overwhelmingly suburban in nature, as well as decidedly polycentric, producing a
lack of a well-defined center that would conceivably produce an upward class
transformation.
In this article, we are interested in addressing both of these empirical gaps through a
case study of recent efforts to deconcentrate, if not dismantle entirely, the largest
service-dependent ghetto still in existence in the USA — Skid Row in Downtown Los
Angeles — and resistance to this process within a context of weak-center gentrification
across the Los Angeles region. We begin by discussing the poverty deconcentration/
gentrification nexus, returning to the two aforementioned empirical gaps. Second, we
outline our methodological approach, followed by a discussion of the context of
homelessness in Los Angeles County. Third, we briefly present the past 20 years of
struggles over policies towards the homeless in Skid Row, Los Angeles. In the 1970s,
policy-makers adopted the policy of containing the homeless in the Skid Row area
through a combination of service concentration and selective police enforcement of
public nuisance laws. This policy, adopted as a way to appease both Downtown
developers and advocates of the poor, sowed the seeds for later conflicts over efforts to
disperse the poor when the homeless population rose amid growing interest in expanding
redevelopment projects. We pay special attention to the central and symbiotic role of
government and private agents (e.g. real estate developers, business owners, police, and
certain non-profit agencies) within these processes of containing and later displacing the
poor. Following Harvey (1982; 1985a; 1985b), we argue that these rounds of Downtown
investment and contrasting efforts to control the territoriality of the poor were primarily
driven by pressures to find a ‘spatial fix’ for capital accumulation. The context of a ‘weak
center’ city, however, has fostered considerable resistance to efforts to deconcentrate the
poor, both from the poor and their allies concentrated within Skid Row, and from capital
and middle class residents within outlying areas.
Deconcentrating urban poverty and gentriﬁcation
In order to bring the nexus between poverty deconcentration and gentrification to the
foreground, we must briefly examine the larger context in which these dynamics operate.
Peck and Tickell (2002) have identified a new, more intensive ‘roll-out’ phase of
neoliberalism in which social policy incursions are increasingly tied to crisis
displacement, deferral, and management (see also Jessop, 2002). Populations excluded
by earlier rounds of neoliberalism and the hollowing-out of the welfare state — the poor,
unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, and low-skilled laborers — are now subject
to greater state authoritarianism and an increasingly punitive re-regulation. Re-regulation
is begetting a more interventionist local state, one engaged in the simultaneously linked
agenda of image-building while also enforcing greater social control over marginalized
populations (Peck, 2001), or what Smith (2002: 80) calls a ‘new revanchist urbanism’.
Recent waves of urban gentrification involve both intensified partnerships between local
governments and private capital and authoritarian policies to contain and repress the
poor. The implementation of ‘zero tolerance’ policies towards crime tends to target poor
racial minorities; it is a reactionary ‘social cleansing strategy’ that attempts to reassert
‘traditional decency,’ thereby facilitating the urban revitalization process (Smith, 2002;
Wyly and Hammel, 2005). Similarly, efforts to police public spaces in the USA have
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been on the rise, including the criminalization of homelessness through the adoption and
enforcement of various ordinances, such as bans on sleeping or urinating on public
sidewalks (Mitchell, 2003; National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, 2006).
Faced with intense inter-urban competition, many local states feel obligated to follow
suit, although the actual impacts upon a very tenacious homeless population have
perhaps been more uneven and ambivalent than the current ‘revanchist’ literature has
portrayed (DeVerteuil, 2006; DeVerteuil et al., 2009).
One policy direction that epitomizes many of the interventionist and strategically
partnered tendencies of roll-out neoliberalism is the aggressive effort to deconcentrate
zones of extreme poverty. Beginning in the early 1990s, the federal government sought
to reinvent public housing through the HOPE VI (Housing Opportunities for People
Everywhere) program. This program funded the demolition of public housing, its
dispersion, and/or efforts at income mixing. While uneven in its impacts across various
cities, the program became a cornerstone of 1990s neoliberal urbanism and an important
initial tool to help ‘turn around’ entire inner-city neighborhoods for their eventual
upgrading (Wyly and Hammel, 1999; Hackworth, 2003; Hammel, 2006). Certain cities,
such as Chicago, have drastically reduced their public housing stock, tearing down large
housing projects such as Cabrini-Green and the Robert Taylor Homes to lay the
groundwork for mixed-use residences. Gentrification has become a systematic private-
public urban strategy at the forefront of a globalized neoliberal and market-oriented
urbanism (Smith, 2002) that encompasses a wide range of upgrading techniques,
including poverty deconcentration and ‘social mixing’ (Newman and Wyly, 2006).
David Harvey’s concept of ‘spatial fix’ is particularly useful for understanding the
underlying forces behind gentrification and poverty deconcentration. Harvey (1982)
argues that capitalists frequently seek ‘spatial fixes’ in order to stave off, at least
temporarily, crises associated with the overaccumulation and devaluation of capital. The
crisis of overaccumulation refers to ‘an excess of capital in relation to the opportunities
to employ that capital profitably,’ which can take the form of money, commodities, or
productive capacity. In the absence of a spatial fix, this crisis is resolved through the
devaluation of capital, which leads to falling rates of profit, declining prices, idle
equipment or physical infrastructures, or falling real wages. Harvey (2001 [1981])
originally used his concept of ‘spatial fix’ to explain such macro-level processes as
imperialism and international trade and investments. Yet, Harvey (1985a: 226) argues
that ‘superior command over space,’ vital to the survival of capitalism, occurs both within
urban regions as well as across nations.
Here, we sharpen our analysis by articulating the concept of ‘spatial fix’ to explain
movements of capital into areas of concentrated urban poverty within Los Angeles and
the pressures underlying efforts to contain or disperse the poor. As Harvey (1985b)
suggests, struggles over the built environment involve various distinct fractions of
capital, including landlords, developers, financial capital, construction companies and
other types of businesses. Concentrated poverty, which tends to agglomerate alongside
the concentration of capital, threatens the interests of capital by potentially reducing the
return on their investment in that area. It encourages social unrest, threatening to
depreciate the value of current or future investments in real estate, businesses and other
aspects of the built environment. As Harvey (1982: 233–34) argues, the built
environment is a ‘geographically ordered, complex, composite commodity’ in which the
‘usefulness of individual elements [of the built environment] depends, to a large degree
upon the usefulness of surrounding elements’ (ibid.). Similarly, he argues that, ‘specific
sites can command a premium land rent precisely because of their privileged location
relative to previous investments’, especially those considered the most desirable by those
with the most income and capital — and their distance from other undesirable elements.
Harvey (1985b: 68) contends that the capacity to express their class interests and shape
public policy is critical for speculative developers and landlords seeking to maximize
their investment returns or rent, just as it is for business owners seeking to maximize their
profits.
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Drawing on these insights, we argue that policies of poverty deconcentration (or
containment) tend to serve the interests of various fractions of capital invested in a
particular area, even as it threatens the interests of capital invested elsewhere. Such state
interventions, which seek to control and discipline the poor and their command of space,
are important mechanisms for transforming social landscapes and making viable ‘spatial
fixes’ for the crises of overaccumulation. These strategies are both shaped by, and help to
shape, the territoriality of social infrastructures, including the placement of police
officers, homeless shelters, and other social services for the poor. The capacity to carry
out policies of poverty deconcentration and containment frequently engender resistance,
both from the poor and their allies, as well as fractions of capital and middle class
residents located elsewhere. Indeed, struggles over the geographic configuration of
poverty are dynamic processes shaped by many contradictory forces, including
economies of scale, ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBYism), profit incentives to invest where
land is cheap, ‘law and order’ interests, trends in public and private funding, and the
organized advocacy on behalf of low-income people, middle class residents, business
owners, and investors. Just as relocating capital at one point in time drives the search for
subsequent ‘spatial fixes’ for capital accumulation (Harvey, 1985a), poverty
deconcentration primarily induces displacement and dispersion of the ‘problem’ rather
than solves it (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Slater, 2006a, 2006b).
While otherwise insightful, the literature addressing the poverty deconcentration/
gentrification nexus may be accused of being rather narrowly focused on just a few
‘typical’ cases and suffering from at least two blind spots. First, little work has examined
poverty zones beyond public housing, such as the ‘service-dependent ghetto’ (Dear and
Wolch, 1987). Perhaps one reason why the reconfiguration of the latter has been ignored
is due to the fact that their demise was seemingly sealed back in the 1980s, when many
‘Skid Rows’ were in fact dismantled (Goetz, 1992; Wolch and Dear, 1993). Census data
reveals an increasing decentralization of the homeless population away from downtown
areas since the 1950s, creating a polynucleated pattern in most cities. With the
revitalization of central business districts, including the implementation and enforcement
of new anti-homeless ordinances and the relocation of services for homeless people,
these trends accelerated in the 1990s (Lee and Price-Spratlen, 2004: 20).
A second gap is the examination of the nexus within a distinctive and divergent
context for gentrification, what we term ‘weak-center’ gentrification. Many newer cities
in the American Sunbelt lack strong or high-amenity downtowns to act as centers of
gravity for anchoring the process of gentrification, instead featuring strongly polycentric
patterns. This runs against the ‘strong-center’, more monocentric patterns found in older,
more established cities such as New York, Chicago, Toronto, Boston and San Francisco,
where the vast majority of studies of gentrification are located and where the process of
poverty deconcentration has been sharper and more longstanding. In such strong-center
cities, the vigorous demand to live near the central business district (CBD) has spurred
the upgrading of proximate neighborhoods for those priced out of the closest markets. In
a polycentric city with a weak center, however, this process is highly uneven and
somewhat muted for the region as a whole, since there is less (or perhaps even no) need
for higher classes to live near the CBD, or that there is no dominant CBD at all (i.e.
Phoenix); rather, mass suburbanization is the dominant urban process. As a result,
polycentric urban regions with weak CBDs, such as Los Angeles and Houston, have seen
their inner-city areas devalue since the 1970s, contrary to the gentrifying experience of
strong-CBD urban regions like New York, San Francisco, Washington, Chicago and
Boston (Hackworth, 2005). At the very least, the concept of ‘weak-center’ gentrification
challenges the notion of the more inner-city focused, monocentric and strong-center
urban pattern — and considers the possibility that urban form can be a potential barrier
to rampant gentrification — and by association, poverty deconcentration (see Shaw, 2005
for other barriers).
Let us briefly apply this concept to a particular setting: the Los Angeles urban region.
Given its size and high profile among urbanists, it seems strange that Los Angeles has in
Deconcentrating poverty in downtown Los Angeles 313
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34.2
© 2010 The Authors. Journal Compilation © 2010 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
fact been decidedly overlooked by the gentrification literature.1 With the exception of
Davis (1990) and Keil (1998), most serious researchers of Los Angeles have little to say
about central-city commercial/residential upgrading and poverty deconcentration,
perhaps because — to the so-called ‘LA School’ — the periphery organizes the center,
which is the complete opposite of gentrification dynamics found in places like New York
and Chicago (Soja, 2000) and perhaps because gentrification seems so weak versus
pervasive suburbanization (Hannigan, 1995). Nevertheless, gentrification has emerged in
various pockets throughout Los Angeles (e.g. Santa Monica, Venice, Hollywood,
Silverlake and Echo Park) even though no one center, not even Downtown Los Angeles,
exerts anything more than a weak gravitational pull on the entire urban region.
Downtown Los Angeles holds 5% of total employment for Los Angeles County (10
million people) and with fewer residents than the downtowns of smaller cities such as
Vancouver and Philadelphia. For these reasons, studying gentrification in Los Angeles
should provide an interesting counterpoint to the currently dominant evidence from
strongly-centered urban regions.
Data and methods
As George (1979) and Burawoy (1991) suggest, the aim of case studies should not be
simply to illustrate or test existing theory, but to reconstruct and further refine it by
addressing theoretical gaps, make sense of anomalies or ‘negative cases’ that are
inconsistent with theoretical expectations and identify new causal patterns. Here, we
seek to address the processes through which the deconcentration of the ‘service
dependent ghetto’ is being carried out within a ‘weak-centered’ city, Los Angeles, the
combination of which has been under-theorized in the urban studies literature.
From September 2004 until January 2007, we conducted ground-level research on
homelessness and revitalization in Downtown Los Angeles, focusing on newspaper
archives, websites, and interviews. We collected material predominantly from the period
1998 to 2007, during which sustained efforts to deconcentrate Skid Row emerged. We
identified relevant articles, using internet search engines such as Lexis Nexis and
Proquest. We examined articles from major newspapers, such as Los Angeles Times, as
well as from local papers such as Downtown News (pro-business) and Community
Connection (the Los Angeles Community Action Network’s newsletter). Both
Government and private websites were used as sources for journals, reports, and press
releases. The unpublished one-year evaluation of the Safer City Initiative by Blasi et al.
(2007) was particularly useful as it provided information on the design and cost of this
policy and its impacts on the numbers of criminal citations in the Skid Row area as well
as recent shifts in sentencing policies affecting residents of this area.
Interviews were conducted by telephone, email and in person with key staff members.
The sample of 15 interviewees focused on important agents of both change and
resistance, including representatives from the Central City East Association (CCEA) —
a local business association, the Downtown Women’s Center, the Los Angeles
Community Action Network (LACAN), the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority,
the National Coalition for the Homeless and the Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger
and Homelessness. The sample also included a precinct captain and a police officer
employed with the Los Angeles Police Department, the Downtown Neighborhood
Prosecutor and Gary Blasi (Law Professor at UCLA). The interviewees were asked 5–10
open-ended questions during interviews ranging from 20–90 minutes in length, which
were transcribed and analyzed. In addition, we periodically consulted with a
1 As of September 2008, a keyword search in Sociological Abstracts on ‘gentriﬁcation’ and ‘Los
Angeles’ revealed only two journal articles.
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videographer, Ernest R. Savage IIII, who was producing a documentary of struggles over
Skid Row in order to keep ourselves updated about the events unfolding there.
Context: homelessness in Los Angeles and Skid Row
Los Angeles County is the homeless capital of the USA, with at least 88,000 homeless
in 2005 (LAHSA, 2006). These numbers are sustained by a lack of living-wage
employment, declining to non-existent welfare support and a severe deficit in affordable
housing which accelerated in the 2000s and pushed many people into homelessness
(Wolch and Dear, 1993; DeVerteuil, 2005). As of 2006, fair market rent for a studio
(no-bedroom) apartment in Los Angeles-Long Beach metropolitan area was US $843 per
month, well beyond the monthly rent affordable to a minimum-wage earner (US $351)
or a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (US $251) (National Low Income
Housing Coalition, 2006).2 In 2006, average rents were US $1,750 a month, 82% more
than a decade ago, while the city lost a total of 9,000 rent-controlled apartments between
the start of 2005 and the end of 2006 (Cleeland, 2006).
Although dispersed throughout the County, the largest concentrations of homeless
individuals are found in older, heterogeneous inner-city neighborhoods where homeless
services tend to cluster in ‘service hubs’ (DeVerteuil, 2006). By far the largest of these
hubs is Skid Row, where a disproportionate array of shelters, single-room occupancy
(SRO) hotels, drop-ins and substance abuse treatment are concentrated. In 2000, this
50-square block area held an astonishing 25% of all the County’s shelter beds — over
13,000 in total (Goetz, 1992; Keil, 1998; CCA, 2002; DeVerteuil, 2006). Although new
shelters have been built in more suburban locales, Skid Row remains by far the largest
clustering of homeless services and people in LA County — a tempting target for poverty
deconcentration. The Skid Row homeless population is particularly vulnerable. It is
predominantly composed of African-Americans, who confront both contemporary
racism and the accumulated disadvantages associated with past racism. Because services
for low-income people are concentrated in the area, the rates of mental disabilities and
substance abuse are also about twice as high among the homeless in Skid Row compared
to the entire County. All of these factors are exacerbated by an unwillingness to tackle
homelessness in a coordinated, well-funded approach, especially when compared to
some other American metropoli — for example New York or Portland, Oregon (Blasi
et al., 2007; Wolch, 2008).
The historical development of Skid Row
Skid Row is situated at the eastern edge of Downtown Los Angeles (see Figure 1).
Today’s Downtown shelters were originally developed in the 1900s to assist those who
came to Los Angeles to find work and settle down. Commercial hotels that used to serve
a ‘transient but working population’ eventually became converted into long-term housing
for low-income people (Spivack, 1998: 5). Containing the homeless in the Skid Row area
began in 1976 as an official city policy, admidst a boom in commercial development of
Downtown Los Angeles (Keil, 1998; Rymer, 2001). The policy, which aimed to stabilize
the provision of low-income housing, particularly SRO hotels and social services in the
Skid Row area represented a compromise between Downtown investors and some public
officials who sought to increase land values by displacing the homeless population away
from Downtown redevelopment projects — and advocates of the homeless, who sought
to protect the homeless and increase their access to shelter space and services (Goetz,
1992; Rymer, 2001). The policy of containment was largely orchestrated by the
2 The US Department of Housing and Urban Development estimates that monthly rent should be no
more than 30% of your income to be affordable.
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Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), which sought to create a ‘24-hour
downtown rivaling any world class city’ (Goetz, 1992: 544), but which agreed to
maintain affordable housing for the poor and services for the homeless in response to
public pressure. To rehabilitate and maintain the buildings and provide affordable
housing, the CRA established the SRO Housing Corporation in the 1980s. The city also
concentrated all social services into one area in order to meet the needs of the local
population (Goetz, 1992; Spivack, 1998; Rymer, 2001). The policy of containment thus
appeased Downtown investors’ search for a ‘spatial fix’ for capital accumulation amid a
burgeoning homeless population, as well as public officials’ interest in maintaining
legitimacy amid rising accusations of their neglect of the poor.
By selectively enforcing the law, the LAPD helped to keep the homeless isolated
within the Skid Row area and out of the redeveloping office core. Containment helped to
protect the interests of large corporates which were invested in other Downtown areas,
but infuriated the Central City East Association (CCEA), representing smaller and less
powerful businesses (such as fish-processing plants and toy manufacturers) located in the
Skid Row area. The CCEA sought unsuccessfully to limit the development of homeless
services in the area and disperse them throughout the city. Many advocates of the poor
did not see the policy of containment as ideal, but it was preferable to the complete
displacement of these residents (Goetz, 1992).
However, the policy of containment had contradictory tendencies that sowed the seeds
of later attempts to dismantle it. First, as Goetz (1992) points out, it became very difficult
to contain a rising population of homeless people, whose spillover into the central
business district threatened the value of investments there. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the homeless street population grew dramatically in the Skid Row area, to the
frustration of local businesses (Wolch and Dear, 1993; Spivack, 1998). The severe
shortage of shelters contributed to rising numbers of homeless people living on the street.
To resolve that issue — and as a result of a legal battle — the Los Angeles Homeless
Services Authority (LAHSA) was developed in 1993 to administer federal funds for
homeless shelters and other services (Spivack, 1998:10). Although LAHSA has
Figure 1 Locator map of Skid Row, Los Angeles
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attempted to disperse services, NIMBY sentiments in nearby cities ensured that a
disproportionate level of homeless services, themselves increasingly unable to serve the
growing homeless population, would become entrenched in Downtown (Law, 2001). The
policy of containment thus created a concentrated and growing constituency of low-
income residents of SROs, homeless people and service providers that has helped to
protect it from further threat of displacement.
There was also a second contradictory tendency to the policy of containment. By
devaluing land in the Skid Row area, the policy created financial incentives for
developers later to invest and redevelop it, especially in proximity to already-redeveloped
areas of Downtown, such as Bunker Hill — the complete antipode to Skid Row and the
site of the earliest displacements of poor people from the CBD (Barney, 2007). The
promise of reaping large profits from redeveloping cheap land and property in Skid Row
coupled with the further appreciating value of existing Downtown businesses and
property, lured investors into the area. The forces of upgrading were officially unleashed
in 1999 — relatively late compared to places like New York and Chicago — with the
passage of the Adaptive Reuse bylaw, which permitted the conversion of vacant
commercial structures into residential buildings (City News Wire, 2004). Investors, such
as the Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, oversaw the creation of
thousands of units of housing: mainly lofts, condominiums, and luxury apartments
(Sterngold, 2003). Recent revitalization trends in Downtown proved to be a profitable
investment; in the previous decade, apartments were sold for US $4–8 per square foot.
By 2004, they cost anywhere from US $50–70 (Flanigan, 2004).
Deconcentrating poverty through housing/service displacement
The concentration and containment of the homeless on Skid Row began to yield by the
late 1990s to deconcentration and displacement pressures. Here, we focus on
displacement of housing and services; next we tackle a second mechanism of poverty
deconcentration: displacement by police action and harassment. In 1999, city zoning
officials identified 11 Downtown residential hotels in Skid Row as public nuisances.
Hotel owners were ordered to improve conditions with renovations and install security
cameras in response to community complaints on crime. In 2003, the city council
demanded the city to ‘begin vigorously enforcing orders to crack down on drug dealing
and prostitution, clear trash and properly dispose of needles and syringes in and near
Skid Row hotels, bars, and liquor stores’ (Rivera, 2003a). While some of these
complaints represented efforts by tenants and their allies to improve the buildings,
pressures on hotels to undergo costly renovations also served business and political
interests to close them. According to Frank A. Weiser, the Travelers Hotel’s attorney,
‘Nobody has ever shown an actual case of someone being arrested in the hotel or crime
originating from the hotel. I think there is a political agenda because these hotels cater to
the homeless, and because of downtown development, they don’t want the homeless or
hotels around anymore’ (Rivera, 2003a). Similarly, the San Julian Hotel was demolished
in 2003 to make space for a children’s park as a result of a public nuisance ordinance and
amidst complaints of drug activities (Rivera, 2003b). The Downtown Women’s Center
(DWC), which provided low-cost housing and services to women living in Skid Row
since the late 1970s, was also slated for relocation in 2008 because of revitalization
efforts (Vincent, 2004).3 Owners of SRO hotels seeking to profit from Downtown
development projects have also practiced illegal evictions of tenants — using the
so-called ‘28-day shuffle’ in which residents are moved every month within the hotel so
they can never claim the legal protections from eviction provided to tenants (Stewart,
2004).
3 Recently, a developer bought a parking lot located near the center with plans to construct new
stores in the area, thus the relocating to the heart of Skid Row.
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The CCEA had long promoted ‘the de-concentration away from Downtown’ for
services for low-income residents, and the more powerful CCA joined them in 2002
(CCA, 2002; Barney, 2007; Blasi et al., 2007). As a CCEA staff person for the
organization explained:
It’s frustrating for the industry to see somebody out there who’s half naked, could be
bleeding . . . no shoes on, screaming obscenities to people in the middle of the street and
clearly crazy and in need of help! . . . We definitely always push for spreading [services]
out . . . We always ask for [law] enforcement . . . Revitalizing downtown, 24/7, that’s what it
[CCEA] plays into.
As this quotation suggests, although CCEA expresses concern for the homeless, its twin
policy agenda of relocating services away from Downtown and increasing law
enforcement is integral to Downtown redevelopment interests.
In response to lobbying from business groups such as the CCEA, and responding to
homeless advocates’ concerns about the need for more social services, County
supervisors adopted a US $100 million deconcentrated regional plan in 2006 to develop
shelters and provide additional assistance and services to homeless people (Streisand,
2006). Rather than locating new shelters and drop-in service centers in Skid Row, they
planned to locate them away from Downtown, in neighboring cities, such as El Monte,
Glendale, Long Beach, Pasadena, and West Covina (Chou and Mezza, 2006). The
creation of new shelters outside of Downtown has been met with substantial community
opposition in more suburban locales however. Already, officials in West Covina and El
Monte have vocally opposed efforts to locate new shelters in their cities (Cleeland,
2006), showing once again how difficult it is to introduce a ‘social mix’ into middle/
upper class neighborhoods — that is, the mirror image of poverty deconcentration and
gentrification (Slater, 2006a).
Deconcentrating poverty through police action
Simultaneous to the displacement of services and housing was the escalating harassment
of the homeless by the police, with greater arrests leading to a de facto displacement
through eviction and imprisonment. As in many other cities, ‘zero tolerance’ policing
strategies have spread to Los Angeles (Parenti, 1999; DeVerteuil, 2006). LA’s Police
Chief William Bratton, hired in 2002, built his career by promoting these types of
policing strategies, which are based on the ‘broken windows’ theory of crime. According
to this theory, advanced by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, violence
can only be suppressed if the ‘quality of life’ offenses that encourage social disorder (e.g.
painting graffitti or breaking windows) are punished swiftly and eliminated. After
bringing ‘zero tolerance’ policing to New York as the City’s Police Commissioner,
Bratton was hired by private security corporations and then toured six continents as an
‘expert’ crime consultant for police and security forces (Smith, 2001). According to
several LAPD officers, however, ‘Before Bratton arrived, we had the same policy.
Bratton just added his philosophy to it’ (personal interview).
In addition to hiring Bratton, the city of Los Angeles hired a group coordinated by
George Kelling to develop the Eastside Detail program for the city. Eastside Detail is
composed of 16 officers and a sergeant whose work focuses on resolving problems
associated with Skid Row’s homeless population (Boyarsky, 2003). As a member of the
LA Community Action Network (LACAN) put it, ‘They brought in this whole team just
to focus on getting the homeless people off the street’. In total, Kelling and associates
were paid US $556,000 in consultation fees for helping the city to design, promote and
implement the ‘Safer City Initiative’ (Blasi et al., 2007).
The Safer City Initiative (hereafter, SCI) was first discussed in a 2002 LAPD internal
memorandum tellingly entitled ‘Homeless Reduction Strategies’. The memo
recommended the hiring of additional officers to police the Skid Row area, the passage
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of various new ordinances prohibiting camping, urination, and defecation in public areas,
as well as the dispersement of social services from the area. Planning meetings for SCI
involved police officers, Downtown business representatives, politicians, as well as
representatives of faith-based groups, Shelter Partnership and People Assisting the
Homeless (Office of Mayor James K. Hahn, 2004; Blasi et al., 2007). The initiative
purportedly aims to ‘prevent violent crime, alleviate fear, improve the quality of life in
the city’s residential neighborhoods, parks, and business districts, and create and support
a climate in which local economic development continues to flourish’ (Office of Mayor
James K. Hahn, 2004).
Under Bratton’s leadership, the LAPD began to enforce long-standing ‘public
nuisance’ laws and ordinances against sleeping on public sidewalks with new vigor,
leading to a surge in arrests of homeless people. Beginning in 2003, the Los Angeles City
Council passed a series of new anti-homeless ordinances as part of the SCI, including a
new ordinance making it illegal to urinate or defecate in public (Garrison, 2003). As the
police captain of the Central division of the LAPD explained in a personal interview with
the authors, ‘we championed this “no urination/defecation” ordinance and the city
council passed that, and that’s what the business community wanted’. By 2004, the city
passed several other anti-homeless ordinances: one that prohibits any person from
parking their car on any city street, lot, or beaches throughout the day and night and
another that restricts people from staying or loitering within the boundaries of a public
library at night. According to members of LACAN, ‘This is just an effort to make it
criminal to be poor’ (Orlov, 2003). In 2004, Los Angeles was ranked by the National
Coalition for the Homeless as one of the meanest cities due to its criminalization of the
homeless (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2004). In 2006, California legislators
passed a new law increasing the penalties for drug trafficking within 1,000 feet of a drug
treatment center or homeless shelter. This measure, supported by Los Angeles politicians
concerned about restoring ‘law and order’ within Skid Row, makes homeless drug
offenders more vulnerable to harsher penalties than drug offenders residing in affluent
communities with relatively few treatment centers (Vogel, 2007).
Under Bratton’s leadership, LAPD officers engaged in a new round of police sweeps
of homeless encampments and arrests of the indigent. In one such sweep in 2002, LAPD
arrested almost 200 people for sleeping or lying on sidewalks (Spalding, 2003). Between
January 2003 and March 2004, a total of 1,473 arrests were made for this crime.
According to several LAPD officers, they are simply enforcing the law and responding
to complaints about the homeless from a ‘broad spectrum’ of people who live and work
in the Skid Row area, including some of the non-profit organizations providing services
to this population:
Some missions and shelters that absolutely do not want homeless people (or, a certain type of
homeless people) hanging out on their sidewalks. The people inside the shelters and missions
are seeking help for . . . addiction to drugs or alcoholism . . . Once you step right out those
doors on that sidewalk, there’s drugs and alcohol readily available for you. So the shelters don’t
even want the ‘shelter resistant’ homeless in front of their places . . . You’ve got huge business
concerns down here . . . It’s their people coming to work every day . . . We got, over in the loft
district, the residents there, the artists . . . they complain about it. Because of the people
establishing domicile up against their building . . . and they make a mess.
Arrests in the Skid Row area escalated after an additional 50 police officers were
reassigned to the area in September 2006, increasing the total number of active field
officers in the city’s Central Division area to 350 (Khalil, 2006). Between August 2006
and June 2007, a total of 10,342 citations were written, including 5,070 felony arrests, in
an area with a total population of under 10,000. Research on a sample of Skid Row area
citations revealed that, ‘. . . all other things being equal, the odds of a person receiving a
pedestrian citation are between 48 and 69 times greater in Skid Row than in the rest of
the City’. About half of all Skid Row arrests are for drug possession or sales. Drug sale
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arrests are mainly made through ‘buy/bust’ stings by undercover officers targeting
addicts and involving small quantities of drugs; felony drug sales convictions render
those arrested ineligible for rehabilitation service alternatives to prison and felons are
barred from various kinds of housing and public assistance after completing their
sentences. The Streets or Services program, adopted as part of SCI, was supposed to
provide those arrested for misdemeanor crimes an option of completing a 21-day
rehabilitation program instead of facing fines or sentences. However, the program was
grossly underfunded and apparently ineffective. Out of 303 people referred to the
program in the first two months of 2007, only 101 were admitted, and a mere 7 people
graduated (Blasi et al., 2007). Quantitative analyses further reveal that the difference in
recent declines in the rate of serious crimes within the Skid Row area and other central
city areas of Los Angeles were not statistically significant, except for robberies,
suggesting that implementation of SCI, has not been effective in reducing serious crime
— contrary to the claims of those championing the initiative (Blasi and Stuart, 2008).
As in other cities, roll-out neoliberalism involves public-private partnerships. To assist
public police officers and street services, Downtown’s Business Improvement Districts
(BIDs)4 administer color-coordinated clean-up crews and safety officers. In Downtown,
there are over 100 private security guards, financed with the 8 Downtown BIDs’ US $12
million budget. LAPD officers praise guards for providing extra ‘eyes and ears’ to the
force, which they claim is under-staffed (Community Connection, 2005). According to
LAPD officers, ‘One BID, in the last year, handled 85,000 calls for service. . . . Now, we
probably wouldn’t have handled all of those, but a number of those calls would have been
handled by us and we just don’t have the officers to do that’.
The CCEA’s safety guards and clean-up crew are known as the ‘red shirts team’.
Subcontracted through Chrysalis (a non-profit organization designed to transition the
unemployed into entry-level jobs), this team includes former parolees, addicts in
recovery and formerly homeless residents from Los Angeles (some of whom are training
to become police officers). Those who were once at the bottom of the social class
hierarchy are now the very forces policing the poor. Safety officers assist the intoxicated,
prevent fights, and prevent vehicle break-ins; they also respond to LAPD requests for
help in enforcing drug laws and conducting police sweeps. As one safety officer says,
‘We use batons, pepper spray, and handcuffs. We can make an arrest depending on the
situation. If we see fights, weapons, [or] somebody got stabbed, we’ll do an actual arrest
and then call PD’. At the same time, safety officers assist LAPD in identifying illegal
vendors who sell hot dogs, DVDs, and ice cream. One clean team staff says, ‘We assist
LAPD in disposing and destroying [property]. Whatever LAPD ask us to do, we assist’.
According to LACAN members, guards possess P38 batons, the same ones police
officers use, and some carry handguns.
For many Downtown businesses, security guards have improved street life in Skid
Row. Carol Schatz, President and CEO of the Central City Association, says, ‘All you
have to do is walk down the street and you can see the change we’ve brought about.
There’s not one person who could say the area hasn’t improved because of BIDs’ (Wan
and Ailworth, 2004: B1). However, homeless people and their advocates question the
accountability of private security officers and the legality of their actions. As Alice
Callahan, who directs a family service center in Skid Row points out, ‘Public sidewalks
are being patrolled by private security guards . . . That’s scary. These guards are only
answerable to private organizations’ (Wan and Ailworth, 2004: B1).
The LAPD, along with other city officials, also investigated reports of police and
hospitals in other areas ‘dumping’ recently discharged prisoners and hospital patients in
Skid Row, prompting the passage of a new law in 2006 making it illegal for hospitals to
dump homeless patients across city boundaries without authorization. By November,
4 Business Improvement Districts establish voluntary taxes for local businesses in order to provide
extra services that the municipality does not provide.
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2006, the city attorney and other legal organizations were preparing law suits to end these
and other types of dumping practices contributing to the concentration of homeless
people in Skid Row (Winton, 2006).
Resistance and inertia to the deconcentration of poverty
The very concentration of housing and services for low-income and homeless people
within Skid Row has encouraged various forms of resistance to arise as it has facilitated
their organization and collective action. Along with protests and lobbying, low-income
residents of the Skid Row area have resisted their displacement through a series of
lawsuits. In 2004, residents at the Bristol Hotel were illegally evicted without warning by
the owner Adolfo Suaya, who hoped to renovate the building as part of Downtown’s
renaissance. Since 1985, the CRA held an agreement with the former Bristol Hotel owner
to maintain the building as affordable units until 2015. Nevertheless, the CRA initially
agreed with Suaya’s plans. Then, under pressure from local residents and negative
publicity, the CRA promised to uphold the 1985 agreement. In response to the evictions,
former residents, with the assistance of the Legal Aid Foundation, sued the hotel for the
damages associated with their wrongful eviction. Barbara Schultz of Legal Aid
comments, ‘You had a population of folks who didn’t know they had any choice but to
leave when they were told to leave. They didn’t know they had any rights as tenants’
(Stewart, 2004).
The Community Action Network and other advocates of affordable housing also
lobbied city officials to create a moratorium on the conversion of SRO housing units into
condominiums or luxury apartments. In 2006, the City Council responded by passing a
temporary moratorium on these conversions, while the Community Redevelopment
Agency issued new guidelines and called for a 55-year commitment by ‘transient’ hotels
to offer ‘affordable’ housing units (Mailander, 2006). In 2008, the moratorium became
permanent and wider ranging, protecting close to 19,000 units in and around Downtown,
an important victory for low-income residents (LA CAN, 2008).
Low-income residents, with the help of community organizations and civil rights
attorneys filed a series of lawsuits against their unlawful treatment by private and public
security officers.5 In 1999, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued four BIDs
when their security guards assaulted and illegally imprisoned the homeless during a
police sweep. Two BIDs then settled the lawsuit ‘agreeing not to photograph, interrogate,
search or order homeless residents to move along’ (Wan and Ailworth, 2004: B1). In
2000, a security guard was physically attacked by co-workers after he criticized them for
violence towards the homeless. The security guard, Wilford Johnson, settled US
$595,000 after suing the BID. In 2004, guards in the Fashion District were charged for
extortion with illegal vendors, earning at least US $50 a day (Wan and Ailworth, 2004).
In 2004, law enforcement conducted a police sweep resulting in the arrest of 21 people
for social security fraud. Dessie Robinson — a disabled woman — and several others
suffering from physical and mental illnesses were arrested at gunpoint. According to
Robinson’s lawyer, the agents ‘acted like they were on some kind of glorified mission,
like they were arresting terrorists from Al Qaeda instead of frightened physically and
mentally disabled people, none of whom reasonably could be perceived as posing a
threat to anyone’ (Rosenzweig, 2004). Although most of the individuals resolved
situations with the Social Security Administration by making reductions on future
checks, law enforcement acted with full power to arrest the individuals. Robinson and
her lawyer claim the arrest was based on racial discrimination since all 21 individuals
5 California law restricts private security guards from using police power; like other private citizens,
they are only allowed to ‘observe and report’. Guards are only authorized to make a citizen’s arrest,
detain, and pat down suspects (Community Connection, 2005: 5).
Deconcentrating poverty in downtown Los Angeles 321
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34.2
© 2010 The Authors. Journal Compilation © 2010 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
were African- Americans (Rosenzweig, 2004). Even before Bratton’s arrival, LAPD was
accused of ‘excessive force’ and pledged to reform itself (Winton, 2004).
In 2003, the ACLU sued the city for its enforcement of a local ordinance, adopted in
1900, banning people from sleeping on public sidewalks, claiming that it was cruel and
unusual punishment given the shortage of shelter beds. In 2006, the US Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the ACLU. The City Council appealed the decision, rejecting
a legal settlement with the ACLU that would have allowed the homeless to sleep on the
sidewalks between 9pm and 6am. City politicians, business leaders (including the
Central City Association), and residents opposed the proposed settlement, claiming it
would attract more homeless into Skid Row. Even so, the city issued temporary
guidelines for enforcing the ordinance only during daytime hours (Hymon and Winton,
2006).
Community groups also put pressure on Bratton to curtail the enforcement of anti-
homeless ordinances by inviting him to discuss the issue with community members. At
the event, homeless residents criticized these ordinances and their enforcement as
inhumane given the lack of available shelter. Community activists also held press
conferences in response to reports of police harassment of the homeless, including their
arrest for the possession of ‘stolen milkcrates’ that were used for seating or storing
personal property. When 50 additional police officers were assigned to the Skid Row
area, community activists questioned the policy at the mayor’s news conference. Alice
Callahan, a service provider, claimed, ‘It’s about real estate . . . It’s about purifying the
public sidewalks so the people moving into these lofts Downtown won’t feel afraid’.
Thoman Jenkins, a homeless resident commented, ‘The money used to pay for the
massive police deployment could be better used to build another low-income shelter’
(cited in Khalil, 2006). Defense attorneys publicized their own complaints with the ‘law
and order’ crackdown on homeless drug addicts in Skid Row, as cases formerly
prosecuted as drug possession cases began to be prosecuted as drug sales cases, leading
to more severe prison sentences (Hong, 2007).
These active and prominent acts of resistance from below also combine with
NIMBYism described above as well as larger forces of inertia and weak-center
gentrification that are limiting poverty deconcentration of Downtown Los Angeles more
generally, and Skid Row more particularly. By early 2008, the Downtown real estate
market was floundering admist over-building, credit crunch and a national slowdown.
The US $600,000 condos now appeared rather overpriced considering that for a similar
amount, a house with a backyard could be purchased within easy commuting distance
and without the sharp social divisions still so apparent in Downtown (DiMassa, 2008;
Hong, 2008).
Discussion
This case study holds several key empirical and theoretical implications about the
struggles over poverty deconcentration under conditions of roll-out neoliberalism and
weak-center gentrification. First, in empirical terms, it is important to note that the
dismantlement of Skid Row has begun but remains far from complete. Most attention has
been focused on displacing the literally homeless as well as SRO hotels on the periphery
of Skid Row. A count of homeless people living on the street in Skid Row, taken in
January 2007, showed that their numbers declined 35% since the same time last year —
from 1,345 to 875 (Khalil and DiMassa, 2007). Otherwise, resistance and inertia has so
far worked against a successful frontal assault; the vast majority of homeless services
remain, with no plans to relocate any time soon. Moreover, homeless people continue to
survive in Downtown (and increasingly nearby) despite horrendous pressures to evict
and displace them all — evidence that established homeless geographies are more
persistent than the more ‘revanchist’ understanding of deconcentration, gentrification,
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and neoliberalization based mainly on case studies of strong-center cities suggests
(DeVerteuil et al., 2009). This also speaks to the relatively late start and slowing nature
of gentrification in Downtown Los Angeles, at least for the time being, rather than a
‘relentless march’ (Slater et al., 2004).
As is characteristic of neoliberal urban policies and local growth coalitions, the
ongoing deconcentration of Skid Row has involved strategic alliances among the local
state (city and County officials and police), the private sector (in the form of business
associations and BIDs) and/or non-profit sectors (well-established service agencies who
want to rid Skid Row of more marginalized groups, such as drug addicts and former
felons, viewed as ‘undeserving’ or ‘shelter resistant’). Simply removing both the literal
homeless and the homeless service providers from Skid Row would be devastating, given
that the neighborhood acts as a key station of last resort for homeless survival County-
wide (DeVerteuil, 2006). The dismantlement of Skid Row risks displacing a crucial
reservoir of cheap housing and support systems for the most vulnerable of populations.
As more homeless people have left Skid Row, shelters in the surrounding communities
have been unable or unwilling to meet the growing demands for emergency beds (Khalil
and DiMassa, 2007).
This case study also illustrates the contradictions inherent in ‘spatial fixes’ for
capitalist accumulation. As Harvey (1985: 61) warns, ‘Although capital can buy back
time for itself out of the space it conquers, it cannot do so indefinitely nor avoid
spreading the conditions for crisis formation over ever-wider spaces’. When capital
investment in Downtown Los Angeles expanded in the 1970s, Skid Row initially acted
as a convenient pool for society’s outcasts, and over time this socio-spatial arrangement
became entrenched with the policy of containment, protecting and attracting Downtown
investments in other areas. However, this very entrenchment created a series of
contradictory crises, as it established a constituency of SRO residents, street people and
homeless service providers that acted as a bulwark against overt incursions. When
homelessness exploded in the 1980s, the overflow from Skid Row threatened to
depreciate the values of surrounding Downtown properties and businesses. The policy
response has been to contain the problem more severely, but as interest in speculative
development in Downtown increased, policies shifted to outright displacement and
deconcentration. The land on the edge of Skid Row, so long devalued and ignored, now
appears both as a potentially profitable investment and as a growing threat to existing
Downtown investments. Thus, the policy of containment, adopted in response to
Downtown investors’ earlier search for a ‘spatial fix’ for capital accumulation and
homeless advocates’ concerns for the poor, generated two contradictory impulses in
subsequent years: elites’ efforts to deconcentrate the homeless and expand Downtown
gentrification — and on the other hand — opposition to that strategy.
Conclusion
Poverty deconcentration threatens to disrupt the existing — and in some cases
longstanding — geography of services and survival strategies for vulnerable populations
within American cities, and to reduce their capacity to mobilize as a group. This is not
to say that Skid Row Los Angeles is an ideal environment for the homeless, for it is
clearly not; rather, it is to say that is (unfortunately) an essential fixture in the business
of homeless survival, given the great difficulties in (equitably) dispersing services to
areas that have none at all.
We have argued here that the processes of poverty deconcentration and gentrification
within ‘weak-centered’ cities differs from those occurring within ‘strong-center’ cities.
Our case study of Downtown Los Angeles shows that there was stubborn resistance to its
gentrification and efforts to disperse poor people away from it. This resistance emerged
among the poor people and their allies concentrated within Downtown, as well as from
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NIMBYism in outlying neighborhoods and cities. Similar sorts of resistance to poverty
deconcentration/gentrification also occurs within ‘strong-center’ urban areas. However,
we would expect that the push for poverty deconcentration to be generally stronger and
resistance to it to be generally weaker within ‘strong-center’ cities than ‘weak-center’
ones, since local capital is likely to be more unified, powerful, and geographically
concentrated in the former cities than in the latter ones. The weakness of capital in the
central city area of ‘weak-centered’ cities also enables homeless and other poor people
to become geographically concentrated there, encouraging greater resistance from below
to poverty deconcentration. Comparative studies of the processes of gentrification/
poverty deconcentration in weak-centered and strong-centered cities are needed to
examine these hypotheses more systematically than is possible through a single case
study. Greater research is also needed on weak-center gentrification in other polycentric
urban regions such as Phoenix, Houston and Atlanta, as well as its implications for
homeless service geographies.
The role of race relations and racism in shaping the processes of gentrification and
poverty deconcentration within such cities also warrants more attention. In the case of
Downtown Los Angeles, most of those displaced are African-American, while most
gentrifiers are white (and possibly Asian). This state of affairs is conveniently
sidestepped in official accounts of Downtown LA’s upgrading, although racialized
conceptions of criminality and poverty are often implicit in the rhetoric surrounding
efforts to disperse homeless services and to enforce ‘anti-homeless’ ordinances. The
racial dynamics involved in these processes are however not so easily avoided when one
moves to street level (Wolch, 2008). In other polycentric regions in Southwest USA,
Latinos have been the main target of poverty deconcentration. Exploring the ways that
race and class interact to shape the experiences of poverty deconcentration, as well as the
rhetoric used to justify or oppose it, would be particularly fruitful lines for future
research.
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Résumé
Cette étude de cas porte sur les efforts entrepris récemment pour déconcentrer la
pauvreté dans le quartier de Skid Row à Los Angeles. Elle examine les processus de
gentrification d’un ‘centre faible’ lorsqu’ils s’appliquent à un ‘ghetto de populations
dépendantes de services’, et comble ainsi deux grandes lacunes des recherches
antérieures. Elle montre comment les intérêts du gouvernement, des entreprises et de
l’urbanisme se joignent à certains organismes non lucratifs impliqués dans le processus.
De plus, elle identifie deux mécanismes clés de la déconcentration de la pauvreté: le
déplacement des logements et/ou services, et la criminalisation des habitants à faible
revenu. Dans le sillage de Harvey, l’étude préconise que les efforts entrepris sont
suscités par des pressions visant à trouver une ‘solution spatiale’ à l’accumulation de
capital en réaménageant le centre-ville. Toutefois, cette démarche a été vivement
contestée, illustrant ainsi la vigueur de la résistance à l’encontre de la gentrification et
de la déconcentration de la pauvreté dans le cadre d’un modèle urbain à ‘centre faible’.
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